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 The Winner's Curse: Experiments with Buyers and
 with Sellers
 By BARRY LIND AND CHARLES R. PLOTT*
 This paper presents a replication and ex-
 tension of experiments with the "winner's
 curse" which were initiated in John Kagel
 and Dan Levin (1984, 1986) and Douglas
 Dyer et al. (1989). The common-value auc-
 tion involves firms bidding for an item of
 unknown common value. Since the value of
 the item is unknown, the winners can bid
 more than the value and thereby lose money.
 The winner's curse occurs if the winners of
 auctions systematically bid above the actual
 value of the objects and thereby systemati-
 cally incur losses. The phenomenon is said
 to occur possibly in the bidding for such
 natural resources as mineral rights, where
 the value of the mineral is unknown but
 each firm has an estimate of the value. Due
 to the field nature of the data, doubts have
 existed as to the actual existence of the
 curse. The Kagel and Levin (1986) paper
 tested for the existence of the phenomenon
 in a laboratory setting. The hope is that, by
 achieving a thorough understanding of the
 phenomenon as it might exist in simple lab-
 oratory environments, economists will be-
 come better equipped to identify and study
 the phenomenon in more-complex field set-
 tings.
 Kagel and Levin (1986) report the exis-
 tence of a winner's curse, but as is the case
 with any seminal experiment, it is impossi-
 ble to control for everything. After seeing
 their data and studying their experimental
 procedures, one finds that there exist alter-
 native explanations for what they saw. The
 winner's curse involves buyers who pay more
 than the value of an item and therefore
 experience a loss. Monetary losses in an
 experiment pose a problem because the ex-
 perimenter generally has no means of col-
 lecting money from subjects. Subjects,
 knowing this, have reason to believe that
 the downside risk on their actions is trun-
 cated, and thus they might be prone to
 more risky actions than would be the case if
 they were forced to suffer full losses. In
 order to minimize this effect, subjects are
 frequently given a cash stake which they can
 lose. Kagel and Levin (1986) were aware of
 the problem, and they provided such a stake
 and used experienced subjects. They also
 required subjects to leave the experiment if
 and when the stake was lost. While these
 procedures provide some control, the possi-
 bility that losses could have contributed to
 the existence of the winner's curse has not
 been completely eliminated (Robert Hansen
 and John Lott, 1991). After a loss or two, a
 subject's reserve could be sufficiently low
 that prospective losses could exceed the bal-
 ance. Thus, inflated bids carry no additional
 risk. Furthermore, one could theorize that
 experience with the curse facilitates learn-
 ing and caution even in people who have
 had experience with bidding on other occa-
 sions. According to that theory, the process
 of removing bankrupt subjects succeeded in
 removing subjects less prone to the curse
 (i.e., those who had the experience of losing
 money and might adjust their behavior ac-
 cordingly). Thus, subjects more prone to the
 curse would remain in the experiment and
 contribute to the existence of the curse. The
 situation is complicated even further by the
 possibility that subjects' beliefs about the
 reaction of other subjects to potential
 bankruptcy could cause general departures
 *Barry Lind is a senior undergraduate and Charles
 Plott is a professor of economics at the California
 Institute of Technology. The financial support of the
 National Science Foundation and the Caltech Experi-
 mental Economics and Political Science Laboratory is
 gratefully acknowledged. We thank Michael Malcom
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 and Hsing-Yang Lee for his help with the graphics. We
 also thank Robert Hansen, John Kagel, Dan Levin,
 and John Lott for their comments.
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 from symmetric Nash-equilibrium behavior.
 Thus, a skeptic could claim that the exis-
 tence, magnitude, and persistence of the
 winner's curse in the Kagel and Levin (1986)
 data were direct consequences of the way
 that Kagel and Levin's experimental proce-
 dures dealt with substantial losses by sub-
 jects. The technique used by Dyer et al. is
 the same as that used in Kagel and Levin
 (1986), so similar questions might be raised
 about it as well.
 The strategy of the research reported here
 is to look for the phenomenon using proce-
 dures that avoid the bankruptcy problems.
 Two different sets of procedures are used.
 First, the "winner's curse" experiment in
 which subjects might lose money was con-
 ducted simultaneously with a second experi-
 ment in which subjects were making money.
 The second set of procedures involved com-
 petitors as sellers in a common-value auc-
 tion. The winner's curse can appear in this
 setting as the sale of an item for less than it
 is actually worth to the seller. The seller's
 loss occurs as an opportunity cost only, so
 the possibility of bankruptcy does not exist.
 The experiments using these different sets
 of experimental procedures produced sev-
 eral results which are the substance of the
 paper.
 1. The winner's curse was observed in both
 experimental settings. In essence, the
 Kagel and Levin results were replicated.
 2. The winner's curse observed by Kagel
 and Levin (1984, 1986) was not a conse-
 quence of their experimental procedures.
 3. The winner's curse might diminish in size
 or frequency but does not completely
 dissipate over time.
 4. The winner's curse is a general phe-
 nomenon exhibited by most agents.
 5. Theories of "suboptimal" behavior ad-
 vanced as explanations of the phe-
 nomenon do not explain the data as well
 as does the completely rational model in
 which the phenomenon does not exist at
 all theoretically.
 The paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
 tion I, the experimental design is outlined.
 In Section II, some competing models are
 discussed. Section III contains a statement
 of the measurement system. The results are
 in Section IV. The concluding section con-
 tains a discussion of conjectures that might
 advance an understanding of the phenom-
 enon.
 I. Experimental Design
 The experiments were two types of com-
 mon-value auctions. The first type of experi-
 ment was the common-value auction as con-
 ducted by Kagel and Levin (1984, 1986) in
 which buyers bid for an item of unknown
 value. Subjects agreed that if they suffered
 losses they would work them off at $10 per
 hour.' In experiment 1, subjects partici-
 pated in a sealed-bid private-value auction
 at the same time that they participated in a
 common-value auction in which the winner's
 curse might occur. In the second experi-
 ment, subjects participated in both a com-
 mon-value auction in which they were buy-
 ers (experiment 2) and also in a common-
 value auction in which they were sellers
 (experiment 3). (In other words, experi-
 ments 2 and 3 were run simultaneously on
 the same subjects.) These secondary auc-
 tions constituted a source of funds which
 reduced the likelihood of bankruptcies in
 case the winner's curse was operative. These
 procedural changes were implemented so
 that subjects had full financial liability in
 the range of financial exposures that were
 likely to exist in the experiments.
 The second type of experiments (experi-
 ments 3-5) were common-value auctions
 with competition among sellers as opposed
 to buyers. The sellers tendered offers to sell
 an item of unknown value. Each seller was
 given one item to sell. Their option was to
 keep the item and collect its value or sell
 the item and collect the revenues from the
 sale. The person with the lowest offer sold
 his item and received the asking price, while
 everyone else kept the item and received
 the value. In this common-value selling auc-
 1Only one subject suffered sufficient loss to be re-
 quired to work. He worked about one hour to cover an
 $8 loss.
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 tion, all subjects earned positive profits, in-
 cluding the winner, but the winner could
 suffer opportunity costs by selling the item
 for less than the amount received by those
 who did not sell the actual value of the
 item.
 The experiments were conducted at the
 California Institute of Technology, using
 undergraduates as subjects. Most of the sub-
 jects had participated in other experiments
 prior to these and were familiar with the
 experimental environment. The subject pool
 serves as a partial control for the hypothesis
 that the curse might be due to confusion
 about instructions. The instructions read to
 the subjects are given in the Appendix. Prior
 to the experiment, the common values of
 the objects were determined by realization
 from a random-number table. Given the
 value of the object, "clues" or "signals"
 were drawn for each subject independently.
 Each subject was given a stack of slips of
 paper which contained the clues to the com-
 mon value of the items being auctioned.
 The slips were stapled so that only the clue
 for the current period could be observed.
 The subject observed the clue and then
 submitted a bid. After the auction, all bids,
 signals, and the common value were posted.
 The winner was then announced. The sub-
 ject removed the top slip to expose the clue
 for the next period.
 The clue was called a signal about the
 true value of the item to be auctioned. The
 value of the item was randomly chosen from
 the range (x, x). If v was the item's value,
 then the signals were randomly chosen over
 an interval (v - E, v + ?), where E is a posi-
 tive value set by the experimenter. In order
 to avoid the winner's curse, the bidder must
 recognize that, if he wins and thus buys
 (sells) the object, then he probably has the
 highest (lowest) signal, which is probably
 above (below) the item's value. Therefore,
 in order for the person not to lose money,
 (forgo profits) he must bid (ask) significantly
 less (more) than this signal.
 Five experiments were conducted. The
 first two were buyer markets which repli-
 cated one of the experimental settings of
 Kagel and Levin (1984, 1986). The next three
 were seller markets. All experiments were
 conducted with seven subjects. Experiments
 1 and 2 had the same set of predrawn
 signals, and experiments 4 and 5 had the
 same set of predrawn signals. The value of
 E for the buying auctions was $30, and it
 was 200 francs in the selling auctions. The
 range from which v was drawn was (x, x) =
 ($25, $225) for the buyer auctions and (x, x)
 = (150 francs, 1,500 francs) for the seller
 auctions. (The franc values were $0.0025,
 $0.001, and $0.0007 for experiments 3, 4,
 and 5, respectively.) The parameter choices
 reflect an attempt to identify unambiguously
 the curse, should it exist. The models re-
 viewed below suggest that the curse be-
 comes more severe with larger E and a
 larger number of people. The parameters
 are those of Kagel and Levin (1986) that
 make the curse severe. Another considera-
 tion was cost. In the seller auctions, all
 subjects (except the seller) were paid the
 value of the item, which makes the experi-
 ments potentially expensive. For example, if
 the value in the seller auction had been
 drawn from the same distribution over dol-
 lars that it was drawn from in the buyer
 auction, then the cost of the experiment
 would have been on the order of $875 ([ex-
 pected value of v] x 7) per period. The scal-
 ing factor that was chosen to reduce the
 cost keeps ? equal to the same proportion
 of the range of v and also permits many
 periods. This creates an obvious difference
 in marginal dollar stakes between the two
 types of experiments, with the potential
 "losses" due to departures from Nash be-
 havior being very small in the selling ex-
 periment. Should otherwise inexplicable
 differences in behavior be observed, the
 magnitude of incentive would be an obvious
 line of research to pursue.
 II. Models
 Assume that v is drawn from a uniform
 distribution. Assume that each xi is drawn
 independently from a uniform distribution
 over the interval [v-?,v+?E]. If xi is the
 signal observed by individual i and the
 structure is common knowledge, the theo-
 retical problem is to model how i chooses a
 bid as a function of xi.
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 At least four models make sense. The
 first is the risk-neutral Nash-equilibrium
 model of the associated bidding game.2 The
 second model is based on the hypothesis
 that individuals make a specific type of cal-
 culation error but still conform to the gen-
 eral principles of game theory. We call this
 the strategic-discounting model. The third
 model is based on the hypothesis that peo-
 ple do not behave strategically. They only
 bid the expected value as if the situation
 were a simple second-price auction of a
 lottery and not one in which strategies might
 be important. This model is called the naive
 model. The fourth model, called the
 private-value model, postulates that individ-
 uals bid as if xi were a private value of the
 object for each i. That is, individuals fail to
 understand the basic statistical relationship
 between value and signals.
 The optimal bidding strategy according to
 the risk-neutral Nash-equilibrium model
 (RNNE) is to bid as a function of the signal
 (xi). Under the buying auction, the optimal
 strategy is
 (1) b(xi) = xi-E + Y
 y = [2E /( n + 1)]
 exp[-(nl/2 E)(xi -(x + E))]
 where n is the number of subjects. Under
 the selling auction, the RNNE optimal
 strategy is
 (2) b(xi) = xi + E-Y
 Y = [2E /(n + 1)]
 exp[ -(n12E)( xi+(.TcE))].
 A strategic-discounting model (SD) is
 postulated by Kagel and Levin (1986) for
 buyer auctions. The model is based on the
 hypothesis that individuals fail to recognize
 that the auction winner will be the subject
 with the highest signal. Kagel and Levin's
 strategic-discounting model can be general-
 ized to the seller auction. The equations for
 the optimal bidding strategy under the as-
 sumption that the bidder fails to recognize
 that the winner has the highest (lowest)
 signal are
 (3) buying auction:
 b(xi) = xi - (2E/n) + (Y/n)
 (4) selling auction:
 b(xi) = xi + (2E /n) - (Y/n)
 The above equations for the RNNE and SD
 models are only valid on the interval x + E
 < Xi <.T - E.
 The naive model (N) for both the buying
 auction and the selling auction simply has
 the bid equal to the signal. The bidding
 strategy for both types of auctions is
 (5) b(xi) = Xi.
 The final model, the private-value model
 (PV), holds that individual i makes the mis-
 take of placing a private value xi on the
 object and that the private value of each of
 the j others is independently drawn from
 the internal xjE[Xi - E, xi + E]. By applying
 risk-neutral Nash theory to this situation,
 bidding functions can be derived. For buy-
 ers, the bidding function is
 (6) b(xi) = xi --
 n
 and for sellers it is
 E
 n
 III. Measurement Methodology
 The four theoretical models lend them-
 selves naturally to a single measurement
 system. The single regression for each indi-
 vidual,
 (8) bit = ai + f3xit + yYit + eit N(O, pi2)
 can be used as a measure of the accuracy of
 all four theoretical models. The equation
 2Obviously, risk aversion is a natural extension. We
 have been unable to find a closed-form solution for the
 bidding functions.
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 TABLE 1-PARAMETER RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY COMPETING THEORETICAL MODELS
 Buying Selling
 Model a c y a 8 y
 Risk-neutral Nash equilibrium - 30 1 1 200 1 -1
 Strategic discounting -8.6 1 0.14 57.1 1 -0.14
 Naive 0 1 0 0 1 0
 Private value - 433 1 0 28.6 1 0
 can be used for both buying auctions and
 selling auctions. A summary of the restric-
 tions on the regression equation imposed by
 the competing theories is included as Table
 1. As can be seen, all theoretical models
 predict ,B = 1. The intercept term can be
 interpreted as 8E, where E is the value of
 the range of the signal {xi e [V - E, V + E]},
 so a = + 1E in the RNNE model, a=
 (2/n)E in the SD model, a= 0 in the N
 model, and a = +(1/n)E in the PV model.
 For the RNNE model, y is + 1; it is + 1/n
 for the SD model, and it is 0 for both the N
 and the PV models.
 The measurement strategy is first to apply
 the unrestricted regression model. The co-
 efficients can be compared to the theoreti-
 cal values of the competing models. Then
 models with parameters as restricted by the-
 ory will be applied. The SSE of the unre-
 stricted model can be used with the SSE of
 the restricted model to compute an F statis-
 tic (Chow test) for the hypothesis that the
 restrictions are not significantly different
 from the unrestricted measurements. The F
 statistic will also be used as a measure of
 the relative closeness of the competing
 models.
 IV. Results
 The results of primary interest bear on
 the existence of the winner's curse. Of sec-
 ondary interest are results that might un-
 cover the principles that govern individual
 decision behavior. The findings are summa-
 rized by five conclusions.
 Conclusion 1: The winner's curse exists.
 Evidence. The per-period profit from all
 auctions is used as a measure. In buying
 auctions, the profit is the actual value of the
 object minus the purchase price of the auc-
 tion winner. In selling auctions, the profit is
 the sale price of the object minus the actual
 price received by the winner. Thus, in sell-
 ing auctions, a negative profit is an opportu-
 nity cost incurred because the item was sold
 for less than it was worth to the seller.
 Table 2 lists the average per-period
 profits from all experiments. As can be seen,
 the winner suffers a loss in four of the five
 experiments on average. The table also re-
 ports the ratio of the number of auctions in
 which a loss occurred to the total number of
 auctions. In all cases, a large proportion of
 the auctions resulted in a loss. The only
 possible exception to the general tendency
 is experiment 4, which was characterized by
 a large number of attempts at collusion. In
 total, more than half of all auctions resulted
 in a loss.
 Conclusion 2: The winner's curse persists
 with experience, but the magnitude and fre-
 quency of losses decline with experience.
 Evidence. The frequencies of losses of the
 auction winners are divided into ten-period
 quartiles for every experiment in Table 3.
 The size of the average loss is also included
 in the table. As can be seen, the proportion
 of auctions in which losses occur is signifi-
 cantly greater than zero in all quartiles.
 Even after 20 or 30 auctions, the winners
 lose money more than 25 percent of the
 time. The frequency of losses decreases af-
 ter the first 10 trials in all experiments ex-
 cept experiment 5.
 The complete time-series of profits for
 experiment 5 is included as Figure 1. The
 figure also shows the profit that would have
 occurred if the agent had used the RNNE
 strategy. As can be seen, the winners' losses
 continue to occur even after 30 auctions.
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 TABLE 2-WINNER's AVERAGE PROFIT AND THE Loss FREQUENCIES
 FOR ALL EXPERIMENTS
 (PROFITS GIVEN IN DOLLARS, WITH FRANCS IN PARENTHESES)
 Number of periods
 Average RNNE with winner's loss)
 Average profit predicted profit (total number
 Experiment per period per perioda of periods)
 1 (buyer) -1.67 (-1.67) 11.13 (11.13) 12/20
 2 (buyer) - 3.60 (-3.60) 8.85 (8.85) 10/17
 3 (seller) - 0.022 (- 8.88) 0.196 (78.44) 8/17
 4 (seller) 0.021 (20.91) 0.069 (69.28) 13/35
 5 (seller) - 0.013 (- 18.55) 0.050 (70.85) 25/40
 aThe given RNNE equation is valid only for: x + e < Xi ? X - e. Some of the
 winners' signals were not in this range, so no predicted RNNE profit is possible.
 Therefore, this average includes only periods for which the RNNE predicted profit
 can be calculated.
 TABLE 3-FREQUENCY OF LOSSES FOR WINNERS IN ALL EXPERIMENTS
 (PROFITS GIVEN IN DOLLARS, WITH FRANCS IN PARENTHESES)
 Experiment
 Quartile 1 (buyer) 2 (buyer) 3 (seller) 4 (seller) 5 (seller)
 Periods 1-10
 Number of periods of loss 8/10 8/10 5/10 6/10 5/10
 Average profit per period -7.90 (-7.90) -8.31 (-8.31) -0.075 (-29.80) -0.048 (-48.20) 0.001 (1.10)
 Average RNNE profit 4.53 (4.53) 5.70 (5.70) 0.177 (70.96) 0.060 (60.44) 0.048 (68.71)
 per perioda
 Periods 11-20
 Number of periods of loss 4/10 2/7 3/7 2/10 7/10
 Average profit per period 4.57 (4.57) 3.12 (3.12) 0.053 (21.00) 0.032 (31.60) -0.016 (-22.40)
 Average RNNE profit 18.47 (18.47) 13.58 (13.58) 0.212 (84.85) 0.048 (48.15) 0.037 (52.68)
 per perioda
 Periods 21-30
 Number of periods of loss 3/10 5/10
 Average profit per period 0.058 (58.40) -0.004 (-6.10)
 Average RNNE profit 0.104 (104.02) 0.090 (128.91)
 per perioda
 Periods 31-40
 Number of periods of loss 2/5 8/10
 Average profit per period 0.063 (62.80) - 0.033 (-46.80)
 Average RNNE profit 0.065 (65.34) 0.024 (33.72)
 per perioda
 aThe given RNNE equation is valid only for: x + E < xl < - e. Some of the winners' signals were not in this range, so no
 predicted RNNE profit is possible. Therefore, this average includes only periods for which the RNNE predicted profit can
 be calculated.
 This experiment has a more severe curse
 than the other experiments. Unlike the other
 experiments, the frequency does not decline
 with experience.
 The first two conclusions offer answers to
 the questions initially posed for experimen-
 tal examination. The next series of conclu-
 sions reflect questions posed in an attempt
 to understand why the phenomenon occurs.
 As was reviewed in the section above, only
 four theoretical models have been ad-
 vanced. The first question posed was
 whether or not any of these four models
 represents the data in a statistical sense.
 Since the answer turns out to be negative,
 the next series of questions is an attempt to
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 FIGURE 1. PER-PERIOD PROFIT AND RNNE PREDICTED PROFITS FOR
 EXPERIMENT 5
 Note: In periods 5, 11, 13, 20, 22, 25, 26, 31, 36, and 37, the signal is not in the interval
 [x + e < xi < x + e], which is the valid range for the given RNNE function. Therefore,
 no RNNE predicted profits are shown
 identify the "best" model and to ask why it
 fails.
 Conclusion 3: All four models (RNNE, SD,
 N, and PV) can be rejected as statistical
 representations of the data.
 Evidence. Table 4 contains the results of
 the Chow test described in the section
 above. In all cases, the statistical model with
 parameters as restricted by the competing
 theoretical models can be rejected as being
 significantly different from the unrestricted
 estimates. For example, the F statistic for
 rejecting the model at a 5-percent confi-
 dence is 2.64, while the statistic for the
 RNNE model for buying auctions is 30.53,
 and for selling auctions it is 5.93.
 Conclusion 4: The RNNE model is the best
 model of the three considered, and the N
 model is the worst.
 Evidence. The pooled data in Figure 2
 show the relationship between individual
 signals and bids. The visual impression fa-
 vors the RNNE model. The scattered data
 in the upper left of the figure for the seller
 auctions are the bids of a small number of
 subjects who were (evidently) signaling for
 collusion.
 Table 5 contains the estimated coeffi-
 cients from pooled data, which can be com-
 pared with the predictions in Table 1. With
 the exception of the xi coefficient, f3, the
 standard errors tell the same stories as do
 the Chow tests discussed below. The param-
 TABLE 4- F STATISTICS FOR THE HYPOTHESIS THAT PREDICTIONS
 OF RESTRICTED REGRESSION AND UNRESTRICTED REGRESSIONS
 ARE THE SAME (DEGREES OF FREEDOM; 5-PERCENT F VALUES)
 Model Buying auctions Selling auctions
 RNNE 30.53 5.93
 (3,226; 2.64) (3,465; 2.61)
 Strategic discounting 133.84 91.22
 (3,226; 2.64) (3,465; 2.61)
 Naive 341.12 160.13
 (3,226; 2.64) (3,465; 2.61)
 Private value 224.87 122.99
 (3,226; 2.64) (3,465; 2.61)
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 Buying Auction Selling Auction
 0 0
 0~~~~~~~
 r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. ~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ X
 0 /~~~~~~~~~/~~
 SS 83 1 1 1 139 1/67 19 350 540 730 920 1 1 1 0 1300
 Signal Signal
 FIGURE 2. PAIRS OF SIGNALS AND BIDS FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS AND ALL EXPERIMENTS
 Key: Longer-dashed line shows the prediction of the N model; shorter-dashed line shows the prediction of the SD
 model; dotted line shows the prediction of the PV model; solid line shows prediction of the RNNE model.
 TABLE 5-ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FOR
 POOLED INDIVIDUALS
 (STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES)
 Experiments a / y
 1-2 - 22.694 0.998 0.514
 (3.156) (0.024) (0.674)
 3-5 341.658 0.863 0.255
 (38.335) (0.046) (1.585)
 eter values estimated by the regression can
 be rejected as being equal to those of any of
 the four models. The /8 term is close to
 1, but this is predicted by all models.
 The intercept term, a, is closest to that
 predicted by the RNNE model. The y term
 has such a large standard error that little
 can be said other than that the sign is in
 agreement with both the RNNE and the SD
 models.
 The major support for the conclusion is
 simply a restatement of the F statistics in
 Table 4. If the F statistic is taken as a
 measure of accuracy, then the RNNE model
 is always more accurate than its closest
 competitor, the SD model. The PV model
 ranks third, and the N model is the worst.
 The F statistics for all models were also
 computed for each individual. For the 35
 individual data sets, the RNNE model was
 the best fit (lowest F statistic) for 25, and 10
 of these did not differ significantly from
 RNNE predictions. The SD model was best
 for all of the remaining 10 individuals, but
 in all cases, the data were significantly dif-
 ferent from the predictions of the SD model.
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 TABLE 6-NUMBER OF TIMES WINNER HAD HIGHEST
 AND SECOND-HIGHEST SIGNAL
 Experiment Highest Second-highest Number of periods
 1 (buyer) 14 3 20
 2 (buyer) 9 8 17
 3 (seller) 11 3 17
 4 (seller) 21 8 35
 5 (seller) 25 7 40
 Conclusion 5: Failure of the RNNE model
 is not due to a few "irrational" people.
 Almost all agents experienced the "curse"
 and bid in a manner that was consistent
 with "curse" behavior.
 Evidence. Table 6 gives the number of
 times that the winning bidder had the high-
 est signal or the second-highest signal. The
 game-theoretic model predicts that the indi-
 vidual with the highest signal will win the
 auction. In each experiment, more than half
 of the auctions were won by the subject with
 the highest signal. As can be seen, decisions
 that resulted in winning the auction were
 not the result of some type of impulsive
 move by some agent with a lower signal; nor
 was it the case that bids differed so much
 across subjects that the fundamental game-
 theoretic proposition that a positive rela-
 tionship exists between bids and signals is
 destroyed. In fact, the empirical result in
 Table 5 that 8 = 1 is strong support for that
 part of the theory.
 Table 7 gives the number of times each
 agent won the auction and the number of
 times each agent lost money as a result of
 winning the auction with a bid that was too
 high. As can be seen, the experience hap-
 pens to most individuals. Of the 28 people
 who won two or more auctions, 20 of them
 lost money 50 percent of the time or more.
 Of the 35 subjects, only eight never lost
 money.
 TABLE 7-NUMBER OF WINNING BIDS SUBMITTED AND NUMBER OF TIMES LOSSES OCCURRED,
 BY SUBJECT AND EXPERIMENT
 Experiment
 Subject 1 (20 periods) 2 (17 periods) 3 (17 periods) 4 (35 periods) 5 (40 periods)
 1
 Number of winning bids 4 5 6 3 7
 Number of times lost money 3 4 2 2 4
 2
 Number of winning bids 3 1 1 6 7
 Number of times lost money 2 0 0 3 4
 3
 Number of winning bids 0 1 4 0 5
 Number of times lost money 0 1 2 0 4
 4
 Number of winning bids 5 2 1 5 4
 Number of times lost money 3 2 0 2 2
 5
 Number of winning bids 4 3 2 6 4
 Number of times lost money 3 1 2 2 2
 6
 Number of winning bids 2 2 2 12 7
 Number of times lost money 0 0 2 3 4
 7
 Number of winning bids 2 3 1 3 6
 Number of times lost money 1 2 0 1 5
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 V. Closing Remarks
 One question appears to be answered
 clearly: a winner's curse can be observed. A
 presumption exists about an answer to a
 second question: it appears that the curse
 can persist over many experiences. A major
 puzzle remains: of the models studied, the
 best is the risk-neutral Nash-equilibrium
 model, but that model predicts that the
 curse will not exist.
 Part of the difficulty with further study
 stems from the lack of theory about the
 behavior of common-value auctions with risk
 aversion. Closed-form solutions which per-
 mit researchers to estimate models of "sub-
 rational" behavior have not been worked
 out. If the effect of risk aversion is to raise
 the bidding function as it does in private
 auctions, then risk aversion together with
 the strategic-discounting model might re-
 solve the puzzle; but, of course, this is only
 a conjecture.
 APPENDIX-INSTRUCrIONS
 Instructions for buyer auctions are those that were used by Kagel and Levine (1986) and can be found in the
 appendix to their paper. Instructions were handed out to subjects, and all examples were also on the chalkboard.
 After the instructions were given to the subjects, they were read aloud by the experimenter, and then the following
 "test" was administered.
 1. Buyer A gets a signal value of $105.00. He bids $100.00 but he is not the high bidder. His (profit/loss)
 is $_ _
 2. Buyer B gets a signal value of $75.00. She bids $60.00 and she is the high bidder. The value of the item is $65.00.
 Her (profit/loss) is $
 3. Buyer C gets a signal value of $161.00. He bids $132.00 and he is the high bidder. The value of the item is
 $131.00. His (profit/loss) is $
 4. Buyer D gets a signal value of $120.00. The value of epsilon is $30.00. Therefore, Buyer D knows that the value
 of the item is between $ and $
 Instructions for the Seller Auctions [Exact Transcript]
 GENERAL
 This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The instructions are simple and if you follow
 them carefully and make good decisions you might earn money which will be paid to you in cash.
 In this experiment we will create a market in which you will act as sellers of a commodity in a sequence of trading
 periods. One unit of the commodity will be auctioned off in each trading period. There will be several trading
 periods.
 Your task is to submit written asks for the commodity. The precise value of the commodity at the time you make
 your ask will be unknown to you. Instead, each of you will receive some information regarding the value of the
 commodity which you may find useful in determining your ask. The process of determining the value of the
 commodity and the information you receive will be described below.
 The currency in these markets is francs. Each franc is worth $ to you.
 The low ask gets the item and makes a profit equal to the ask. If you do not make the lowest ask on the item, you
 will earn the value of the commodity.
 During each trading period, you will be selling in a market in which all of the other participants are also selling.
 After all asks have been handed in, all signals and asks will be posed on the blackboard. We will circle the low ask
 and post the value of the item.
 The value of the auctioned commodity (V) will be assigned randomly and will lie between 150 and 1500 inclusively.
 For each auction, any value within this interval has an equally likely chance of being drawn. The value of the item
 can never be less than 150 nor more than 1500. The values V are determined randomly and independently from
 auction to auction. A high value of V in one period tells you nothing about the likely value in the next period. It
 does not even preclude the same value of V appearing in later periods.
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 Although you do not know the precise value of the item in any particular trading period, you will receive
 information which will narrow down the range of possible values. This will consist of a private information signal
 which is selected randomly from an interval whose lower bound is V minus epsilon, and whose upper bound is V
 plus epsilon. Any value within this interval has an equally likely chance of being drawn and being assigned to one of
 you as your private information signal.
 Throughout this experiment, the value of epsilon is 200.
 PRIVATE INFORMATION SIGNALS
 Although you do not know the precise value of the item in any particular trading period, you will receive
 information which will narrow down the range of possible values. This will consist of a private information signal
 which is selected randomly from an interval whose lower bound is V minus epsilon, and whose upper bound is V
 plus epsilon. ANY VALUE within this interval has an EQUALLY LIKELY chance of being drawn and being assigned
 to one of you as your private information signal. You will always know what the value of epsilon is.
 For example, suppose that the value of the auctioned item is 762 and that epsilon is 200. Then each of you will
 receive a private information signal which will consist of a randomly drawn number that will be between 562
 (V - epsilon = 762 - 200) and 962 (V + epsilon = 762 + 100). Any number in this interval has an equally likely chance
 to be drawn as your signal value.
 The line diagram below shows what is going on in this example.
 V - epsilon V + epsilon
 [V ]
 150 { signal } 1500
 values may be
 anywhere in this
 interval
 EXAMPLE
 The value of the auctioned item is 762. This is the information each seller received, and the asks each seller made:
 SELLER # SIGNAL VALUE ASK
 1 590 703
 2 756 900
 3 838 947
 4 634 778
 5 716 775
 6 847 920
 7 642 825
 In this example Seller #1 submitted the lowest bid, so he sells the item. His profit is the sale price 703. Seller #1
 received 703 while the other sellers receive the value 762.
 You will note that the value V of the auctioned item must always be between your signal value minus epsilon, and
 your signal value plus epsilon.
 Finally, you may receive a signal value below 150 or above 1500. This merely indicates that the value V of the
 auctioned item is close to 150 or 1500.
 Your signal values are strictly private information. DO NOT REVEAL THEM TO ANYONE ELSE. You are NOT to
 reveal your asks or profits, nor are you to speak to any other subject while the experiment is in progress.
 You will not be told the value of V until after all the asks have been collected and posted.
 No one may ask less than 0 for the item, nor may anyone ask more than 1700 (which is the maximum value of V
 plus epsilon). In case of ties for the low ask, we will flip a coin to decide who gets the item.
 Are there any questions?
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